Until now, peace has been maintained through that trusty diplomatic midwife of strategic ambiguity. The core element in that ambiguity has been the tribute paid to the political fiction of “One China.” The People’s Republic of China insists there is one China and that Taiwan is part of it. It has always said it would use force if Taiwan declared independence. In March it went further and declared in a white paper that it reserved the right to use force if Taiwan delayed talks leading to unification indefinitely.
For a long time the Taiwanese held to the same One China theory, simply insisting that it was the Republic of China, not the PRC, that had sovereign rights over the whole country. In 1991 the Taiwanese government abandoned that claim while holding to the idea that China still needed to be reunified. In May newly elected President Chen Shui-bian in Taiwan conceded in his inauguration address that he could imagine dealing with the Chinese on the question of “a future One China.” Last week Chen went even further and said that he might accept a formula tentatively agreed by officials of both sides in 1992, by which China and Taiwan could retain their own formulations of what One China meant.
Unhappily, each side remembers what it likes of the 1992 formulation: the PRC that One China was accepted, Taiwan that each side could interpret it in its own way. The United States continues to recognize the One China principle but would be delighted with any compromise that allowed for talks to take place.
Politically, the fact is that China and Taiwan are growing further apart, not coming closer together, and the Beijing-Taipei- Washington triangle is becoming very strained. It is time to settle soon on the right formula for talks. Of the three countries most concerned, China is least happy with the status quo, least satisfied with the previously accepted notion that unification is a genuinely long-term goal and most sensitive to attempts to prolong the current arrangements. Yet every attempt by China to assert the urgency of the issue for itself inspires Taiwanese nationalism and American defense of the principle of self-determination. Any overt attempt by China to take over Taiwan would compel the United States to defend Taiwan. While China would lose such a conflict, knowledge alone of that probability may not be enough to deter China from using force.
The security situation, therefore, is delicate. President Chen’s willingness to embrace the 1992 formula needs to be worked on. That formula was an oral agreement; now both sides should write down it, to avoid doubt about the mutual acceptance of the One China concept and to establish individual flexibility in the way it is adopted. Combining the strategic ambiguity of the One China principle with the strategic clarity that allows each side its own interpretation of it should open the path to a resumption of the cross-strait dialogue. Unlike any of his predecessors, Chen has nothing to prove: no one doubts his national credentials. Though he leads a party filled with members who want independence and who reject One China, he could carry the country on a revised version of the 1992 formula. Unlike any of his Beijing predecessors, President Jiang Zemin has witnessed a democratic change in Taiwan. He would be praised for having that regime, born of Taiwanese national politics, accept a version of One China. Both should be urged to settle soon on a peacemaking formula that is there for the taking.
In July the heads of government of the Group of Eight will meet in Okinawa. This is the first G8 meeting in Asia since the Tokyo summit of 1993. In the current circumstances, it would be an act of strategic negligence if the G8 states did not address the China- Taiwan issue. The countries of the G8 should urge in their final communique that the two sides resume their dialogue immediately. The G8 countries need not refer to the One China principle or to the 1992 oral agreement, but the import of their message must be that China and Taiwan develop a mutual understanding of the formula that should govern their relationship as friends.
For many G8 governments, mention of this subject in Okinawa would be controversial. The Japanese would worry about sticking their necks out. The Russians, solicitous of their relations with China, would be reluctant to be seen as interfering in China’s internal affairs. The Europeans would be cautious for the sake of it, and the Americans would worry about losing control over a process, even though they do not have any lien on it and do not in any case want to mediate this issue.
But President Chen needs to be encouraged to continue to find inventive ways to speak to the PRC, while the PRC needs reminding that threatening force is the worst way to charm Taiwan into closer relations. And Washington needs wider support for the diplomatic route; otherwise it may find itself facing unpalatable military options. A written version of the 1992 oral agreement is the right formula for China and Taiwan to remain at peace with each other. And encouraging them to talk is the right thing forthe G8 heads to do in Japan.
