PIORE: What do you see as the most important issues in the coming year? FUKUYAMA: I think for the next year, obviously, the whole resolution for the occupation of Iraq–and, more broadly, America’s place in the world. We paid a high cost in terms of our relations with a whole series of countries, including close allies like Germany and France. One of the things we’ll have to do is fix that. I think launching pre-emptive wars is pretty much off the table. Iraq has become this big black hole that has sucked all the energy out of Bush foreign policy. It’s consumed so much political capital that there is very little left over for further demonstrations of American power around the world.
Does Cancun mean the erosion of the movement toward free trade?
No, I don’t think so. Everybody knew that agriculture would be the biggest problem [at the World Trade Organization talks], and it was always an implicit deal where you trade intellectual-property rights for agricultural [subsidies]. The developed countries found it too hard to live up to their end of the bargain. But that’s a very hard deal to make. So I’m not surprised it broke down on the first try. This won’t be the last time they come at this.
Do the troubles of the European Union mean the end of the idea of a single European project?
What troubles? It’s just bargaining. This project is a long-term one, and whatever setbacks occur, they’ll keep at it. I [do] think there’s going to be a natural evolution in the European Union away from the traditional domination by France and Germany. That’s just the consequence of expansion. And I think that in many ways, in the long run this expansion is quite hopeful. For example, a common agricultural policy is going to come under a lot of stress once expansion happens. Over the longer term, Europeans will be forced to really confront these subsidies in a much more serious way.
Do you think that the liberals will win the battle within the Muslim world?
I think that eventually they will. But the real question is, what’s the time frame? I have absolutely no prediction on that.
Why are radical ideologies so powerful in the Muslim world?
I think it’s a combination of lack of democracy, a lack of development, frustration with American foreign policy–some combination of all of those. It’s such a big question. The solution is more democracy, more development and some kind of resolution of the Palestinian issue. But that’s a project for another generation or two.
Fifteen years out, do you still think we have reached the end of history?
Clearly we’re in a period in a lot of turbulence right now because of all this Islamic radicalism. But over the long term I still do. “The End of History” was a story about where modernization was taking us, and I think there’s still a pretty clear endpoint to that. Part of the world has reached it already, and other parts of the world are trying. I think that as China modernizes, for example, it will find that it needs more pluralistic institutions. I just don’t think you can hurry the process. You can only help along the margins.
Islamists came pretty close to killing President Pervez Musharraf recently. What would happen if he were killed?
Pakistan is a very troubled state, so I think it would not be at all good. On the other hand, I just got back from New Delhi. There is a peace process underway there. There’s been a ceasefire along the line of control. And [Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari] Vajpayee is going to go to Pakistan to talk with Musharraf. They’ve made more progress with this in the last year than they have in the last generation. Part of it, I think, is that India is feeling much more confident because of an increasingly good economic growth record. This is one of the stories to watch in the next few years: India could start taking off the way China has done. That, obviously, will have huge implications for the entire region.
